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Abstract – This study examines supply chain power in 
the context of real earnings management. Accrual-
based models are often used to examine the motives of 
managers in conducting discretionary accruals. 
Discretionary accruals by managers has a very broad 
impact and may mislead users of financial statements. 
This study analyses and examines the effect of 
company profitability on discretionary accruals, 
especially in emerging markets in Indonesia. This 
empirical study samples manufacturing sector 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
from 2006 to 2016 and uses dynamic models with 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. 
This paper finds that the motives for signalling 
managers still influences the existence of discretionary 
accruals, and ROA, PBV, and EPS have a positive 
and significant effect on discretionary accruals. These 
findings prove that managers engage in discretionary 
accrual when reporting the profitability of the 
company. Leverage negatively affects discretionary 
accrual and the control mechanism of the current 
debt even though the effect is marginal. This study 
only examines the profitability motives of managers in 
conveying information to outsiders, and acknowledges 
that discretionary accruals may be influenced by 
variables beyond this study. 
Keywords – Discretionary Accrual, Supply chain 
management, signalling motive, profitability, and 
leverage. 
1. Introduction  
Interorganizational relationships create both 
opportunities and risks in supply chain management 
(SCM). Prior research on relationships examines 
the performance effects of firm power, supply chain 
(SC) membership, and SCM competence, where 
power refers to the ability of one SC partner to 
influence the actions of another Managers often use 
discretionary accruals in earning management [1]. 
Testing the motives of managers in conducting 
accrual discretion is an interesting topic for 
researchers in testing earnings management [2]. 
Accrual-based models are often used to test the 
motives of managers to make accrual discretion in 
the reporting of financial statements. Although they 
have weaknesses, they are still a reference for 
researchers in measuring earnings management [3-
4]. Discretionary accrual in earnings management 
practices has a very broad impact on the economy 
of a country [5]. There are many cases where 
immoral financial managers negatively influence 
society. The case of Enron and WorldCom is 
evidence of the practice of accrual discretion that 
misleads users of financial statements [6]. 
Discretionary accrual is mostly practised by 
companies when going public [7]; companies that 
experience financial difficulties, meet incentive 
managers, control stock prices, renegotiate debt, 
and maintain company performance [8]. Managers 
engage in accounting choices when performing 
discretionary accruals. It is not a significant 
problem in developed countries, but a problem in 
emerging markets wherein company ownership is 
highly concentrated and investor protection is poor 
[9].  
Concentrated ownership has the power to organise 
management to work based on the wishes of the 
owner so that they influence outsiders to achieve 
specific purposes. The board of directors as 
observers does not function as intended where 
managers tend to use them to give good signals, 
even though they practice abnormal accruals [10]. 
Managers who have different interests from the 
owner will usually be bound by a contract (nexus of 
contract) to avoid asymmetric information in the 
form of moral hazard and adverse selection [11]. 
Furthermore, Laela & Ermaya [12] find no 
significant relationship between asymmetric 
information with earnings management. Good 
financial statement information can increase 
company transparency, corporate competitiveness, 
and reduce the occurrence of adverse selection and 
moral hazard [13]. The higher asymmetric 
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information between the agent and principal 
provides evidence of the practice of accrual 
discretion by managers. 
In this paper, we examine the earnings management 
motives carried of managers using the signalling 
theory approach in reporting earnings to outsiders. 
Managers convey profits as one of the signals sent 
to competitors, customers, suppliers, or other 
interested stakeholders (for example, the 
government, shareholders, the public) with various 
interests [14]. The development of accounting 
information does not yet conveying quality 
information comprehensively, so stakeholders need 
to understand the impact of asymmetric information 
on decisions taken, especially when managers are 
under stress [15]. Such information is widely 
available in emerging markets, especially in 
informing outside parties about performance. 
Signalling theory is related to reducing information 
asymmetry between two parties [16]. Management 
researchers have also applied signalling theory to 
help explain the influence of information 
asymmetry in various research contexts. For 
example, a recent corporate governance study 
shows how CEOs observe the quality of signals 
from their companies to attract potential investors 
through the quality of their financial statements 
[17]. 
The Indonesian capital market over the past 10 
years has experienced good development, and CSPI 
has experienced a gain of 193.36%, which is the 
highest increase among the major exchanges in the 
world. Capital market growth must also be followed 
by efficiency levels in the market and compliance 
of issuers in providing relevant information for 
investors. At present, the Indonesian capital market 
is still in the category of emerging markets and has 
a low level of corporate governance among other 
countries in Asia [12]. Ownership of public 
companies in Indonesia is highly concentrated 
among foreign investors [18] and family firms [19]. 
This constitutes the basis of why investor protection 
is a problem that needs to be studied, and to provide 
full input on good capital market management. 
Concentrated ownership creates agency problems 
between managers and outside ownership and 
conflicts between shareholders [20]. 
Discretionary accrual in the financial statements is 
something that must be considered by the regulator. 
Investors will be sceptical in seeing earnings 
reports presented by management, especially the 
declining performance in quarterly reports after 
annual earnings announcements [21]. Managers, as 
representatives of company owners, have high 
incentives and the authority to manipulate and 
deceive financial statements to obtain direct 
benefits for personal or indirect benefits for the 
company [22]. As a language of business, 
accounting information must be able to bridge 
between standards and practices [23-24]. 
This study examines how company profitability in 
financial statements affects discretionary accrual by 
considering the SCM. We use the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation method as 
one of the tools that researchers have not used 
before, to determine the profitability motives for 
discretionary accruals in financial statements. This 
model can solve the endogeneity problem that 
results in parameter estimation being biased and 
inconsistent [25] and getting more robust results 
[26]. Studies have found endogeneity problems that 
are interrelated between dependent variables and 
discretionary accrual [27]. This happens when the 
explanatory variable correlates with the error term 
[28]. GMM can eliminate the problem of 
endogeneity by using instrumental variables so that 
estimates are consistent. 
Research has found evidence of asymmetrical 
information between managers and investors due to 
manager/individual behaviour conveying 
information to incomplete users, especially in 
inefficient markets [24]. They will use accruals in 
manipulating accounting information to meet 
analyst expectations, avoiding losses, maximising 
manager compensation, debt negotiating, and 
maximising stock prices when IPOs [29]. 
Instead, managers will convey information in the 
form of good signals to outsiders by providing 
information such as dividend policy [30] to obtain 
loans [31] by providing quality information about 
the company [32]. Managers convey good signals 
from their companies to potential investors through 
the observable quality of their financial statements, 
shareholders [33], and marketing good products. 
Company executives have more information 
concerning the company and its performance. This 
encourages managers to convey this information to 
potential investors to increase the stock prices of 
the company [33]. Information conveyed by 
managers will give signals to investors in making 
investment decisions. The market will react 
regardless of whether the information is positive or 
negative. The signalling theory in financial 
statements states that increasing the level of 
forward-looking information in the annual report 
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narrative is an important mechanism for delivering 
corporate revenue signals in the future [34]. 
Our study contributes to the literature in two 
respects. First, this research is expected to be an 
input for a review of the standard setters regarding 
the standardisation of financial statement 
submission that is free from various interests in the 
capital market, and creates a healthy capital market 
condition. To date, no regulations have been issued 
by the Indonesian government to protect investors 
such as mispricing in determining the value of 
existing companies. Second, this study is expected 
to provide input to governments, especially in 
providing strict sanctions against companies that 
have irregularities in the delivery of financial 
statements, and for issuers of affirmations and 
sanctions for ethical violations in earnings 
management. This study examines the signalling 
motives in increasing earnings that play a role in 
conveying information by managers to users. 
Signals in information serve as a means of 
expressing expectations of managers on the future 
cash flows [35]. Testing the existence of 
discretionary accruals with signalling motives is 
interesting to review because many previous 
findings support the existence of this motive in the 
submission of financial statements. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; 
section 2 focuses on a review of the literature and 
hypotheses development, section 3 presents data 
and methodology, section 4 discusses the results 
while section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development 
Currently, the focus of the SCM studies has 
evolved from economic and environment issues to 
incorporate social issues. SCM studies are more 
concerned now with exploring the interaction 
between social issues and SCM practices. Research 
on the use of discretionary accruals has been widely 
carried out to test the existence of earnings 
management, and research on market efficiency is 
widely carried out by capital market researchers 
[36]-[38]. Studies indicate that managers are 
interested in performing discretionary accruals to 
maximise their bonuses [39-40]. Discretionary 
accrual are also carried out to avoid failure of debt 
payments, and interest payments [36,41] to get 
around industry and regulations [42] to meet 
revenue estimates and targets issued by financial 
analysts or management [43] and in connection 
with the IPO process [44]. 
Studies have shown a preference for a positive 
relationship between signalling motives and their 
relationship to the existence of discretionary 
accrual in reporting financial statements [45]. The 
hypothesis of signalling mentions the efforts of 
managers to use discretionary accruals in 
conveying the financial information of the company 
to the capital market and the prospects of the 
company. When this information is received by the 
market, investors will react positively to the 
delivery of contemporary corporate earnings 
information [46].  
Asymmetrical information between managers and 
investors can be reduced by conveying signals in 
dividend policy [47]-[48], obtaining loans (debt) 
[49],[31], and conveying quality company 
information [50]. The CEO will convey a good 
signal from his company to potential investors 
through the observable quality of their financial 
statements [51] to shareholders [52] and product 
marketing problems [53],[32]. 
Investors will see that the income statement can 
provide a signal of prosperity and is a profit that is 
relatively growing and stable (sustainable). When 
earnings decline, the accounting will report 
engineered profits. Penman [54] states that 
sustainable earnings are earnings that have high 
quality and are indicators of future earnings. 
Accrual accounting provides information related to 
stock returns and the determination of stock market 
prices. Accrual accounting provides a space for 
managers to exercise discretion in reporting 
earnings. In signalling theory, the focus is on the 
actions of managers who intentionally inform 
information that cannot be directly observed by 
outsiders. Useful signals for outsiders must meet 
two factors consisting of observability and cost 
signal [52]. The accrual concept is used to convey 
company personal information in terms of 
profitability, such as companies that use dividend 
change policies [55].  
Diverse investor perceptions of the value of accrual 
in the financial statements as a benchmark may not 
necessarily be able to detect discretionary accrual in 
the financial statements. They believe that the firm 
value in the future is strongly influenced by the 
accrual policy applied to the company [56]. An 
analysis of the profitability of the company is 
carried out by investors to see which stocks can 
describe the level of good returns expected by 
investors. The return on asset (ROA) valuation is 
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used to see the ability of a company to manage each 
asset value to generate net profit after tax [90]. The 
higher the ROA value of a company, the better the 
ability of a company to manage its assets. However, 
having a high ROA does not necessarily produce a 
good return. ROA can measure the ability of a 
company to generate profits in the past and then 
project earning in the future. The value of ROA 
will affect investor confidence in companies in 
deciding their business decisions. Heterogeneity of 
investor confidence in the value of accruals in the 
financial statements as a benchmark may not 
necessarily be able to detect discretionary accruals 
in the financial statements. Hence, this paper 
hypothesises: 
H1. Return on Assets (ROA) has a positive effect 
on discretionary accrual. 
Another profitability analysis often used by 
investors in assessing firm value is the price-to-
book value (PBV) [57]-[58]. Managers will always 
try to provide fair firm values to maintain their 
performance which happens a lot in developing 
countries, especially when the management and the 
board of commissioners are from the same group 
[59]. This analysis is a fundamental indicator of 
stocks and is used by investors and analysts to 
determine the fair value of shares [18]. This 
indicator is obtained by dividing the price of shares 
in the stock market by the book value of the shares. 
Stocks with large PBV ratios can be said to have 
high valuations (overvalued), while stocks with 
PBV below 1 have low valuations (undervalued).  It 
is reasonable to assume that the market value 
motive is one of the bases for managers in 
conducting accrual discretion. Thus, the second 
hypothesis is: 
H2. Price-to-Book Value (PBV) has a positive 
effect on discretionary accruals. 
There are many analyses concerning Earnings Per 
Share (EPS) which provides indications that the 
company can increase the prosperity of investors, 
and encourage them to increase the amount of 
capital invested. EPS becomes one of the bases 
used by management and the board of 
commissioners in dividing dividends. For investors, 
EPS information is considered the most basic and 
useful information because it can describe the 
prospects of earnings in the future, although almost 
20% of financial managers believe that the value of 
EPS is not representative [60]. This can happen in 
earnings management because there is a tendency 
for management to repurchase outstanding shares to 
increase the value of EPS [29]. There are many 
cases in emerging market countries of managing 
accruals in dividend policy so that the company 
reputation is maintained, especially to access 
external funds [61]. Based on these references, the 
analysis of EPS needs to be examined as one of the 
motives for profitability in formulating the accruals 
of financial statement policies. Thus, the third 
hypothesis is: 
H3. Earnings Per Share has a positive effect on 
discretionary accruals. 
 
When managers use accruals to inform the financial 
future, they will increase the value of accruals to 
give a positive signal to the market. The signal aims 
to overcome the problem of inappropriate 
information between managers and shareholders 
[62]. Investors also observe the amount of debt of 
the company, and will assume that the high level of 
debt will have an impact on the benefits to be 
obtained. Debt can also be a tool or mechanism and 
can reduce asymmetric information and agency 
conflicts between managers and owners [63]. Debt 
can strengthen or weaken the motives of signalling 
managers in conducting discretionary accruals in 
financial statements. Bergstresser & Philippon [64] 
found evidence of a positive and significant 
relationship between debt and discretionary 
accruals, which showed that when accruals were 
high for years, managers made various options, 
including conducting discretionary accrual and 
selling shares to employees. Lai [65] states that 
when a company has a high level of debt, the level 
of discretionary accrual conducted by the company 
tends to be at the low level as well. The debt 
position informs that the financial signals of the 
company are going well, especially in meeting 
interest commitments and avoiding violations of 
debt contracts [9]. From here, we hypothesise:  
H4. Leverage has a positive effect on discretionary 
accruals.  
In making decisions on investments, investors will 
analyse financial statements where the information 
presented in the financial statements must reflect 
the condition of the company that reflects the truth. 
When the financial position shows good results, 
then they will be interested in buying shares and 
will affect the stock prices [66]. The stock price is 
the price that will be bought by investors as proof 
of share ownership. Investors will always observe 
the movement of stock prices because the value of 
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their prosperity is determined by the stock price, 
and it affects the firm value that will be an 
important indicator for the company.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
This study aims to determine the effect of 
signalling motives toward discretionary accruals on 
public companies in the manufacturing sector, and 
uses unbalance panel data obtained from 117 
companies from 2006 to 2016. The samples are 
taken from companies that have issued financial 
statements in a row for eleven years accessed on the 
official website of the IDX (www.idx.co.id). The 
analysis of this study adopts dynamic models, 
namely the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM). The use of this model is more consistent 
and unbiased compared to static models, such as 
fixed effects because the GMM model can 
eliminate the endogeneity factor found in fixed 
effects [67]. One of the ways to eliminate this 
endogeneity is by using instruments of variables so 
that it corrects errors in the model [68]. Baum states 
that researchers must confront various choices in 
determining instrument variables. The primary 
empirical problem is heteroscedasticity. 
Endogeneity testing and over-identifying 
restrictions are invalid if there is heteroscedasticity. 
GMM is a more efficient estimation model 
compared to simple instrumental variable 
estimators. The expected OLS estimation results are 
inconsistent with the initial hypotheses that have 
been built and is theoretically irrelevant. For 
example, the PBV estimation results have a positive 
influence in theory, but OLS estimates show a 
negative effect and render the coefficient results 
biased. This approach suspects that there is 
endogeneity. This reference follows the concept 
carried out by [69]. Endogeneity checking is carried 
out in the first step by estimating PBV models with 
the same independent variables and taking the 
residuals. Then, the estimation is conducted on 
discretionary accruals. PBV residual results have 
significant results. The second proof is by checking 
the heteroscedasticity test (LR test) and the residual 
correlation test (CSD test), where both reveal 
significant results.  The implementation of the 
GMM model is expected to have more accurate and 
consistent results, especially micro panel data 
where N> T [70]. This research model uses GMM 
difference where all instrument variables are 
transformed into the difference. 
3.1. Estimation of discretionary accruals 
By using the modified Jones model, Dechow [40] 
used the model in the calculation of accrual 
earnings management with the following formula: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  �𝛼𝛼0∗ + 𝛼𝛼1 ∗ � 1𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛼𝛼2∗(∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 −
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) + 𝛼𝛼3∗(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖)�                                 (1) 
DA         : Discretionary accrual is the difference 
between total accruals and the fitted non-
discretionary accruals 
TA          : Total accruals, defined as the earnings 
before extraordinary items (NI) – 
operating cash flows (CFO).  
A  : Total assets. 
ΔREV  : Change in revenues. 
ΔREC  : Change of accounts receivable  
PPE  : The gross value of fixed assets 
 
The dynamic model for examining signalling 
motives is as follows: 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(−1) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
Where: The instruments used are all independent 
variables on the basic model consisting of ROA, 
PBV, EPS, and DER. The appropriate instrument 
variables in the model depend on Hanses J-
statistics. If the Prob J-statistic is higher than 5%, 
the instrument model is valid. Conversely, if the 
Prob J-statistic is lower than 5%, the instrument is 
invalid. Furthermore, the GMM requirements that 
must be met are free from serial correlation. 
4.    Results and Discussions 
4.1. Descriptive analysis 
Before discussing statistical data, we pay attention 
to descriptive data by describing the variables in the 
following table. The analytical tool used is the 
mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum 
as presented in the following table. 
Based on Table 1, the discretionary accrual variable 
of the total N sample is 1879 manufacturing 
companies. Statistical results show that the average 
value of the discretionary accrual variable is -
0.09996 with a standard deviation of 6.462458. SD 
value is very high compared to the average value, 
which means a large deviation from the number of 
observations studied. Herawaty [40] finds that the 
average earnings management is -0.013005 and the 
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standard deviation is 0.2404, which means that the 
average company in the study sample tends to use a 
decreasing income strategy. The average 
discretionary accrual is by -0.008 and the standard 
deviation is 0.095 [71], while the average 
discretionary accrual is -0.0028 with a standard 
deviation of 0.1049 [72]. Research conducted on 
companies in Malaysia finds an average 
discretionary accrual in earnings management of 
0.033 [73], which is greater than the average 
practice in Indonesia. 
Manufacturing companies in Indonesia have a 
maximum DA value of 54,487, and the minimum 
value is -0.0999. This shows that the average value 
of discretionary accruals per year of observation is 
different from the value of 0. This proves that most 
manufacturing companies in Indonesia are still low 
in manipulating reports through income decreasing 
actions to increase profits and fiscal strategies [74]. 
Astari & Suryanawa [75] found that the average 
discretionary accrual in manufacturing companies 
is 1.9472, with a standard deviation of 0.4531. The 
aggregate calculation of discretionary accruals 
carried out by Trisnawati [76] finds that the average 
discretionary accrual at Lq 45 companies is 0.1695 
for seven years of observation. In another case, 
Agustia finds [77] that the average discretionary 
accrual is -0.011597, with a standard deviation of 
0.243031. Pujiati & Arfan [78] find an average 
discretionary accrual of 0.1423, with a standard 
deviation of 0.2090. The company uses this to show 
good company performance in the hope of 
attracting investors in short and long term 
investments [79]. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for major variables  
 
 N Mean Max Min Std. Dev. 
DA 1879 -0.09996 54.48708 -274.246 6.462458 
ROA 1879 6.271059 1210.11 -101.44 30.91461 
PBV 1879 2.308789 74.9 -163.93 6.984161 
EPS 1879 177.3767 49712.43 -46687.8 2167.388 
DER 1879 115.0784 27437.07 -5917.06 903.4572 
Note: DA=discretionary accrual, differences between actual 
total accruals and the fitted values of the modified Jones model, 
ROA (return on asset), PBV (price to book value), EPS (earning 
per share), DER (debt-equity ratio). 
The average return on asset (ROA) value is 
6.271059, the average price-to-book value (PBV) is 
2.308789, and the earnings per share (EPS) value is 
177.3767. The movement of ROA in manufacturing 
companies is mostly influenced by the level of 
earnings management. This is caused by ROA 
because it is related to the level of profitability and 
firm size [80]. A study conducted on 139 
manufacturing companies from 2006 to 2009 found 
that the average EPS value was 58.9265, while 
research conducted on 70 mining sector 
manufacturing companies in 2006-2010 found an 
average EPS of 3.73616 [81]. Other studies 
obtained an average EPS of 0.755 [82]. The 
average value of the debt-equity ratio (DER) is 
115.07, with a standard deviation of 903.45 
compared to other studies that show that the 
average debt to the manufacturing companies 
studied from 104 companies in 2006-2008 was 
1.2084 [83]. A study in America found that the 
average debt value of companies from 1996 to 2007 
of manufacturing companies was 0.25 [84]. The 
average value of debt incurred in Malaysia was 
0.165 [73]. This debt ratio value shows that the 
average return on asset (ROA) value is 6.271059, 
the average price-to-book value (PBV) is 2.308789, 
and the earnings per share (EPS) value is 177.3767. 
The movement of ROA in manufacturing 
companies is mostly influenced by the level of 
earnings management. This is caused by ROA 
because it is related to the level of profitability and 
firm size [80]. Another study conducted on 139 
manufacturing companies from 2006 to 2009 found 
that the average EPS value was 58.9265, while 
research conducted on 70 mining sector 
manufacturing companies in 2006-2010 found an 
average EPS of 3.73616 [81]. Other studies 
obtained an average EPS of 0.755 [82]. The 
average value of the debt-equity ratio (DER) is 
115.07, with a standard deviation of 903.45 
compared to other studies that show that the 
average debt to the manufacturing companies 
studied from 104 companies in 2006-2008 was 
1.2084 [83]. A study in America found that the 
average debt value of companies from 1996 to 2007 
of manufacturing companies was 0.25 [84]. The 
average value of debt incurred in Malaysia was 
0.165 [73]. This debt ratio value shows the 
proportion of the debt of the company to the total 
assets. Investors can use this debt ratio to find out 
the debt of a company compared to its assets. 
Creditors can also measure the risk given to a 
company. A high average debt value motivates 
managers to make accrual discretion so that their 
companies avoid contracting debt contracts [36]. 
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4.2. Determinants of Discretionary 
Accruals 
As explained earlier, this study explores the effect 
of profitability signals on the discretionary accrual 
of the manufacturing sector companies using the 
GMM model. The GMM estimation results are 
explained in Table 2: 
𝑌𝑌 =  0,0013 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑋𝑋1 + 0,0372 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑋𝑋2+ 0,0007 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋3
− 5,02𝑅𝑅05𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑋𝑋4 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
Table 2. Dynamic Panel GMM estimation results 
Variables Coefficient Std. error t-stat Prob 
ROA 0.0013 0.0056 4.29 0.000** 
PBV 0.0372 0.00003 14.43 0.000** 
EPS 0.0007 0.0025 6.23 0.000** 
DER -5.02E-05 0.0001 -4.53 0.000** 
DA(-1) -0.0145 0.0056 -2.56 0.011* 
Note: *significance 5%, ** significance 1%. Hansen test = 0,319 
(instrument rank = 48).  
AR(2) = 0.22 
 
Based on Table 2, return on assets (ROA) has a 
positive and significant effect on discretionary 
accruals, with a coefficient of 0.0013 and a 
probability of 0,000. It reveals that ROA can 
influence discretionary accruals in the case of 
manufacturing companies. ROA can be one 
indicator that reflects the company’s financial 
performance, the higher the value of ROA, the 
better the company’s financial performance [85]. 
ROA is also used to measure accounting 
performance. This is the main analytical tool used 
by investors to measure the profitability of the 
company. The health of a company is assessed from 
ROA, where companies with a higher ROA value 
tend to perform income smoothing compared with 
lower companies. Because management has 
internal information, they know the ability of the 
company to make profits in the future and can more 
easily delay or accelerate earnings [86]. 
Corporate managers tend to use accrual accounting 
policies when their company conditions are 
unhealthy [27], and when they prioritise their 
interests [46]. In contrast, they tend to survive and 
use real accruals in good company accrual 
conditions. The results of this study prove that the 
profitability value of companies proxied by ROA 
has a positive and significant effect on discretionary 
accruals carried out by managers at manufacturing 
companies in Indonesia. This condition is proven 
when they experience poor performance, where the 
ROA value is still high and influences discretionary 
accruals in a stable capital market condition. 
Usually, investor’s measure accounting 
performance based on ROA levels. However, in 
companies with strong ownership concentrations 
such as Indonesia, information obtained from 
accounting and market performance may not 
contain the same information [87]. This finding 
provides evidence of the Efficiency Market 
Hypothesis theory in emerging markets, which 
states that stock prices have not fully reflected the 
information in the market. In this case, it assumes 
that past data cannot always be used as a reference 
for information in the future [88]. 
PBV determination analysis of accrual discretion 
can be seen as one of the fundamental indicators of 
a stock. Studies used PBV as one of the aspects of 
profitability that measures firm value. Stocks with 
large PBV ratios can be categorised as having high 
valuations (overvalued), while stocks that have 
PBV below 1 have low valuations or (undervalued) 
and have good fundamentals. Investors will use the 
PBV value as a positive signal and a good prospect. 
For this company, the demand for its shares will 
increase so that the price of the book value will rise. 
The faster the growth rate of a company, the more 
funds needed to finance expansion. This study 
shows that the price-book value (PBV) has a 
positive and significant effect on discretionary 
accruals. This finding proves that managers engage 
in discretionary accruals to increase the value of the 
company. PBV value is currently used by the 
Indonesian capital market in determining IDX 
Value 30 and IDX Growth 30 to issuers that have 
good PBV. The motives of managers increase the 
value of accrual accounting so that investor 
confidence in companies increases [89]. PBV 
information is an important signal needed by 
investors to invest. When the information is 
announced, the market will respond and judge 
whether it is a good or a bad signal. 
  Earnings per share (EPS) is 0.0007 and has 
a positive and significant effect on discretionary 
accruals, which means the H0 hypothesis is 
accepted. EPS value is used as a measure in the rate 
of returns of the company [91]. This study supports 
the signalling hypothesis whereby managers will 
maintain that changes in stock prices/stock returns 
will follow changes in company policy including 
company dividend policies [92]. Managers will be 
motivated to do corporate disclosure to give a 
positive signal to all parties to increase the stock 
price and the credibility of their companies. This 
can set various expectations from investors and 
other related institutions [93-94]. Managers tend to 
be conservative in reporting EPS because they are 
be required to provide good short-term performance 
information by following the interests of the 
owners. EPS will always be managed by managers 
[60] because this revenue manipulation is very 
difficult to detect from the outside as it involves the 
availability of information that can be accessed 
directly by stakeholders. 
Testing of debt as a signal in financial reporting is 
proven to be able to act as a mechanism of control 
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over the existence of accrual discretion in 
Indonesian manufacturing companies. The debt 
(DER) is found to be negatively and significantly 
related to discretionary accruals, accepting the H1 
hypothesis, where debt can weaken managers in 
conducting accrual discretion in the financial 
statements. This study is in line with that raised by 
[63], which states the role of debt as one of the 
mechanisms of control of managers as agents for 
preparing financial statements. Managers tend to 
change accruals when they are stuck in debt [41]. 
Conflicts between shareholders and creditors occur 
when they have different interests. Creditors have a 
major claim on interest income and principal loan 
instalments, while shareholders can access through 
managers at the company and hold control over the 
operational decisions of the company that can affect 
the cash flow of the company and related risks. The 
control mechanism through debt occurs in 
Indonesian manufacturing companies. Although the 
relationship is weak, it can provide evidence that 
the role and function of monitoring by external 
parties can put pressure on managers in managing 
accruals. These findings are in agreement and 
support the agency theory. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The use of accruals and supply chain management 
in earnings management has become an important 
issue related to the issue of capital market 
credibility. Supply chain strategy by managers is 
the topic of most interest and is discussed by 
researchers. This study supports the signalling 
theory, agency theory, and the efficiency market 
hypothesis (EMH), where managers will use 
accruals to increase the relevance of reported 
earnings to help investors better assess the 
operating performance of the company, although 
sometimes the value will change in the following 
year. 
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